University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions

The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection

3-10-1953

State Bd. of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, State Bd. of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners 40 Cal.2d 436 (1953).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/811

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

436

STATE BOARD v. THRlFT-D-Lux CLEANERS
[L. A. No. 21666.

In Bank.

[40 C.2d

Mar. 10, 1953.]

STATE BOARD OF DRY CLEANERS, Appellant, v.
TIIRlFT-D-Ll~X CLEANERS, INC. (a Corporation) et
a)., Respondents.
[1] Constitutional Law-Police Power-Scope.-The police power
extends to legislation enacted to promote the public health,
safety, morals and general welfare.
[2] Id. - Constitutionality of Statutes - Duty to Uphold. - If
there is a proper legislative purpose, a law enacted to carry
out that purpose, if not arbitrary or discriminatory, must be
upheld by the courts.
[3] Id.-Police Power-Legislative Discretion and Court Review.
-In exercise of police power the law places limits on the
Legislature's discretion, and whether there has been a reasonable exercise of this power is a court question.
4] Id.-Police Power-Price Regulation.-Previous enactment of
statutes for regulation of dry cleaning industry, including
fire protection, safety devices and safeguards, etc. (see Health
& Saf. Code, div. 12, pt. 2 j Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 8, 19;
Lab. Code, div. 5, pt. 1), furnish support for conclusion that
they were designed to and do fully protect the public health
and safety, and that minimum price provisions of the Dry
Cleaners' Act of 1945 (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 9560-9567) have
no function to that end, but constitute an unnecessary and
unreasonable restriction on the pursuit of private and useful
business activities.
(6) Id.-Police Power-Price Regulation.-Dry Cleaners' Act of
1945 (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 9560-9567), authorizing the State
Board of Dry Cleaners to establish minimum price schedules
for various items of cleaning, dyeing and pressing services,
cannot be justified as a war or emergency measure, where
there is nothing in the dry cleaning business which distinguishes it frOID the multitude of other businesses offering
services to the general public, and wh,ere the disturbances
and violence which existed in the dry cleaning business during the period of economic stress prior to W orId War IT
were common to other businesses.

r

[1] See Cal.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 108; Am ..Jur., Constitutional Law, § 271.
McK. Dig. References: [1,12] Constitutional Law, §100; [2]
Constitutional Law, § 48; [3,7] Constitutional Law, § 107; [4,5,
13] Constitutional Law, § 104; [6] Constitutional Law, § 105; [8]
Constitutional Law, § 56; [9-11] Constitutional Law, § 102; [14,
15] Constitutional Law, § 85.
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[6] Id.-Police Power-Limitations.-A legislative body may not,
under the guise of providing for the general welfare, impose
unnecessary and unreasonable restrictions on the pursuit of
useful activities.
[7] Id.-Police Power-Court Review.-If a statute has no real
or substantial relation to any legitimate police power objective, it is the duty of the court so to declare.
[8] Id.-Constitutionality of Statutes-Presumptions.-Every intendment will be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of
a legislative enactment.
[9] Id.-Police Power-Occupations.-At least where a business
is affected with a public interest or clothed with a public use,
it may be regulated under the general welfare concept.
[10] Id.-Police Power-Occupations.-The phrase "affected with
a public interest" does not imply that some particular industries are and others are not subject to legislative control;
it means that where the control is for the public good any
industry may be regulated, provided that there is "adequate
reason" for it) and such reason can only be to achieve a
purpose within the police power of the state.
[11] Id.-Police Power-Occupations.-The "affected with a public interest" doctrine is no longer limited to those industries
in the nature of public utilities.
[12] Id.-Police Power-General Welfare.-Any legislation to be
justified and supported by the concept of "general welfare"
must aim to promote the welfare of a properly classified segment of the general public, as contrasted with that of a small
percentage or a special class of the body politic where no
such classification can be justified.
[18] Id.-Police Power-Price Regulation.-Dry Cleaners' Act of
1945 (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 9560-9567), authorizing the State
Board of Dry Cleaners to establish minimum price schedules
for various items of cleaning, dyeing and pressing services,
is invalid because it is not, by any recognized standard, an
enactment providing for the public health, safety, morals or
general welfare; it seeks to establish but a single grade of
work in the dry cleaning industry and to eliminate the economical cleaning job, which a substantial group of the public may prefer, and it does not prevent the imposition of
fraud on the public, nor eliminate destructive and unfair
competition, which practices are adequately legislated against
in the Unfair Practices Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, div. 7, pt.
II, chap. IV).
.
[9] See Cal.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 111; Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 289 et seq.
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[14] Id.-Delegation of Power-To Administrative Bod7.-While ""
the delegation of governmental authority to an administrative body is proper in some instances, the delegation of absolute legislative discretion is not, and to avoid such a result
it is necessary that a delegating statute establish an ascertainable standard to guide the administrative body.
[16] Id.-Delegation of Power-To Administrative Body.-Dry
Cleaners' Act of 1945 (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 9560-9567), authorizing the State Board of Dry Cleaners to establish minimum price schedules for various items of cleaning, dyeing
and pressing services, is invalid because the attempted delegation of legislation is made to persons directly interel!ted in the
operation of the regulatory rule, and the penal provisions of
the statute establish no guide for exercise of the delegated
authority.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Clarence M. Hanson, Judge. Affirmed.

~~

Action to enjoin violations of Dry Cleaners' Act of 1945.
Judgment dismissing action on sustaining demurrer to
amended complaint without leave to amend, affirmed.

)

Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Alberta Gattone
and J. Albert Hutchinson, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Appellant.
Robert Kingsley as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Appellant.
Adele I. Springer for Respondents.

:;".,
:~A

SHENK, J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment of dismissal _.
after the defendants' general demurrer to the amended com-:~
plaint was sustained without leave to amend. The demurrer
is based on the ground that the minimum price provisions of
the Dry Cleaners' Act of ]945 (Bus. & Prof. Code, ch. 18, '
art. 5, §§ 9560-9567), under which the plaintiff sought injunctive relief against the defendant's alleged violations of
that act, are in violation of the due process clauses of the
state and federal Constitutions. The ruling on the demurrer
presents the sole question on appeal.
The act provides for the creation of a State Board of Dry
Cleaners consisting of seven members: one from the general
[14] See Cal.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 85; Am.Jur., Constitu-

tional Law, § 238 et seq.
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public; two owners of retail plants; two owners of wholesale plants; and two owners of shops. Article 5, in sections
9560 through 9567, provides for" Minimum Price Schedules."
Section 9560 empowers the board to act; section 9561 permits the members of the board to have access to cleaning
establishments; section 9562 provides for rules of procedure,
notice and hearing. Section 9563 provides:
"The board may establish minimum price schedules for
the various items of cleaning, dyeing and pressing services
for any city or county or other area as may be determined
by the board upon the filing of a petition with it, requesting a minimum price schedule for that . • . area signed by
seventy-five per cent (75%) or more of the persons in that
... area who are licensed under this chapter."
Section 9564 provides:
"Upon receipt of a petition under this article the board
shall investigate and ascertain those minimum prices which
will enable cleaners, dyers, or pressers in that city or county
or other area to furnish modern, proper, healthful and sanitary services, using such appliances and equipment as will
minimize the danger to public health and safety incident to
such services.
"In establishing minimum price schedules, the board shall
consider all conditions affecting the business of cleaning,
dyeing and pressing in that city, county, or other area and
the relation of those conditions to the public health, welfare
and safety."
Section 9565 provides that the ·board shall conduct a cost
survey and states that "the board shall not fix a price for
any service at a sum less than that which is shown to be
the cost price of sUch service. . . ."
Section 9566 provides for the readjustment of minimum
price levels either on the initiative of the board or on complaint of 51 per cent or more of the persons licensed in the
area, if the board determines that "the minimum price so
established or any of them are insufficient properly to provide healthful and proper services to the public and to maintain a clean, healthful, safe and sanitary cleaning, dyeing
or pressing establishment, or that any minimum price set
creates an undue hardship on any licensee under this act . . ."
Section 9567 provides for injunctive relief upon complaint
by the board against violators of the minimum price schedules
established by the board.

)
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In July, 1947, 75 per cent of those licensed by the board
in numerous cities in Los Angeles County petitioned the
board to establish minimum prices in both wholesale and
retail fields. Basing its action upon its own cost surveys,
the board established and published its minimum Price Schedules. In September, 1949, the board filed a complaint charging the defendants with violations of the price schedule and
with threats to continue to do so. The board had established a minimum price to be paid for cleaning and pressing·
a man's suit at $1.00. The defendant Thrift-D-Lux Cleaner
was charging 69 cents for the iame service.
If the statute can be sustained as constitutional it is
because it is a reasonable exercise of the police power
of the state. [1] Under the law generally that power extends to legislation enacted to promote the public health,
safety, morals and general welfare. [2] It has rightly been
said that "such [police] regulations may validly be imposed
if they constitute a reasonable exertion of governmental authority for the public good. If there is a proper legislative
purpose, a law enacted to carry out that purpose, if not
arbitrary nor discriminatory, must be upheld by the courts."
(In rc Fuller (1940), 15 Ca1.2d 425, 428 [102 P.2d 321].)
[3] Howeycr, in the exercise of the police power the law
places limits on the discretion of the Legislature. Whether
there has been a reasonable exercise of this power is a court
question.
It is first contended by the plaintiff that the price fixing
features of the statute were designed to protect the public
health and safety. The statutory law in California meets
this contention head on for it has made detailed and adequate provisions elsewhere for the proteetion of the public's
health and safety through the regulation of the dry cleaning
industry. (Chapter 2 [Fire Protection-Clothes Cleaning
Establishments] and chapter 3 [Fire. Protection-Spotting,
Sponging, and Pressing Establishments] of part 2, division
12 of the Health and Safety Code; subchapter 4 [Dry Cleaning Equipment Employing Volatile and Inflammable Solvents] and subchapter 5 [Spotting, Sponging and Pressing
Establishments] of chapter 1 [State Fire Marshal], title 19
[Public Safety] of the California Administrative Code; article 6 [Laundry, Dry Cleaning, and Dyeing Industry], chapter 5 [Division of Industrial Welfare], title 8 [Industrial
Relations] of the Administrative Code; chapter 2 (Safety
Devices and Safeguards], part 1 (Workinen 's Safety], divi-
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sion 5 [Safety in Employment] of the Labor Code.) It is
not contended that the present statute is invalid merely because the Legislature could reach the purported objective
through the enforcement of the provisions of the above cited
statutes. [4] The previous enactment of these statutes furnish support for the conclusion that they were designed to
and do fully protect the public health and safety and that
the price-fixing features of the present statute have no function to that end. On the contrary they constitute an unnecessary and unreasonable restriction on the pursuit of private
and useful business activities. The asserted objective of
those portions of the statute are not in fact their real objective. There is therefore nothing relating to the price
charged for such services that has any real or 'SUbstantial
relationship to the public health or safety.
[6] The proponents of the validity of the statute would
justify it in the light of troubled conditions which they
claim existed prior to W orld War II, although they are adverse to applying legal concepts generally accepted during
that same period. The statute does not purport to be nor
can it be justified as a war or emergency measure. During
periods of emergency such as a state of war or of general
economic distress the courts have recognized a broad legislative discretion dealing with such situations in the interest
of the public welfare. It does not appear that at the time
this legislation was enacted there was any such general emergency affecting all private businesses alike. There is nothing
in the dry cleaning business which distinguishes it from the
multitude of other businesses offering services to the general
pUblic. The disturbances and violence which are said to
have existed in the dry cleaning business during the period
of economic stress prior to the last World War were common
to other businesses. It is important to note that the statute
itself in no way purports to prevent destructive and unfair
competition or to suppress violence.
[6] It is claimed that the price-fixing portions of the
statute were enacted to provide for the general welfare. But
a legislative body may not, under the guise of providing for
this component of the police power, impose unnecessary and
unreasonable restrictions upon the pursuit of these useful
activities. [7] If a statute has no real or substantial relation to any legitimate police power objective, it is the duty
_of the court to so declare. (McKay Jewelers, Inc. v. Bow-
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ron, 19 Ca1.2d 595, 600 [122 P.2d 543, 139 A.L.R. 1188].)
[8] In this connection it is recognized that every intendment will be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of
a legislative enactment (Hart v. City of Beverly Hills, 11
Ca1.2d 343 [79 P.2d 1080]), but the presumption of constitutionality is not conclusive.
The question of the validity of a price fixing law as related to tI!e general welfare was involved in the case of In
re Herrick (1938),25 Cal.App.2d 751 [77 P.2d 262]. There
the court declared unconstitutional an ordinance which fixed
a minimum price for the cleaning of a man's suit of clothes.
The declared purpose of the ordinance was "the restoration and maintenance of the highest practical degree of public welfare." The court in that case relied on the decision
in In re Kazas (1937), 22 Cal.App.2d 161 [70 P.2d 962],
which had declared unconstitutional an ordinance for fixing
minimum prices for a haircut and shave. In considering
whether legislation aims to promote the public welfare as
a component part of the police power, the court properly
recognized that the concept of public welfare had undergone a process of development through the years. Traditionally the power to legislate for the public welfare was
not much more comprehensive than the power to legislate
for the public health, safety and morals. In Munn v. Illinois (1876), 94 U.S. 113 [24 L.Ed. 77] it was considered
that only where a person had entered the field of public
service in the use of his property did he consent to its regulation for the public welfare. [9] In this state and elsewhere it is established that at least where a business is "affected with a public interest or clothed with a public use"
it may be regulated under the general welfare concept.
(Nebbin v. New York. 291 U.S. 502 [54 ·S.Ct.. 505, 78 L.Ed.
940] ; Agricultural Prorate Com. v. SuperiorC01trt, 5 Cal.
2d 550, 582 [55 P.2d 495].) In the Nebbia case a New York
statute est.ablishing a minimum price for the milk industry
of that state was upheld on the ground that the end sought
was within the scope of the legislative power of the state
to insure an adequate supply of wholesome milk for public
consumption.
[10] It is argued that the "affected with Ii public interest" doctrine was abandoned in the Nebbia case. On the
contrary that case may be cited merely for an interpretation
of that doctrine. At page 536 the court stated that the
phrase can mean "no more than that an industry, for ade-
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quate reason, is subject to control for the public good." (See,
also, Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 245-246 [61 S.Ct. 862,
85 L.Ed. 1305, 133 A.L.R. 1500].) If the phrase means only
what the Supreme Court has said it means, then it remains
an adequate test. It does not imply that some particular
industries are and others are not subject to control. It means
that where the control is for the public good any industry
may be regulated, provided there is "adequate reason" for
it. That" adequate reason" can only be to achieve a purpose within the police power of the state. The test emphasizes that the control must be for the "public good."
[11] When the "affected with a public interest" doctrine
is applied in this sense it is an adequate and proper test.
As it was traditionally applied to confine regulation to only
those industries in the nature of public utilities it is admittedly no longer so limited.
[12] Regardless of the legal terminology used in defining
the test employed, any legislation to be justified and supported by the concept of "general welfare" must aim to promote the welfare of a properly classified segment of the general public as contrasted with that of a small percentage or
a special class of the body politic where no such classification
can be justified. In the Kazas case the court held that the
ordinance legislated for the benefit of barbers alone, who
made up 2 per cent of the community, and that the "ordinance does not purport to consider the welfare of the other
ninety-eight per cent of the population of the city nor the
effect on them of fixing the minimum prices to be charged
for cutting their hair or shaving their masculine faces~" It
was also held "that on the face of the ordinance it affirmatively appears that the legislation was not intended to promote the general welfare of the people . . . but only a small
group composing a very small proportion of the population.
. . ." As further evidence that the ordinance did not consider the interests of the general public, the court noted that
the ordinance "attempted to pour all barbers and barber
shops into a common mold, turning them out exactly alike
regardless of skill or efficiency of operation, excellence and
completeness of equipment, desirability of location or expense
of conducting business."
[13] The statute before us is not dissimilar to that considered in the Kazas case. It seeks to establish but a single
grade of work in the dry cleaning industry and to eliminate
the economical cleaning job. It does not take into considera-
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tion the "skill or efficiency of operation, excellence and com- i
pleteness of equipment, desirability of location or expense·
of conducting business." It does not consider that a substantial group of the public may choose to purchase a cheaper
grade of cleaning for particular garments, knowing that:
they are not obtaining the quality of service offered by more
expensive establishments. The statute does not purport to
prevent the imposition of fraud upon the public, nor to eliminate destructive and unfair competition, which practices are
adequately legislated against in the Unfair Practices .Act
(Bus. & Prof. Code, div. 7, pt. II, chap. IV) . .As in the Kazaa
case, this statute would seemingly have the effect of enhancing
the economic status of the industry and enlarging the pronts
of each operator. The record shows that an advance in prices
will benent less than 1 per cent of those persons who comprise the dry cleaning operators in Los Angeles County.
On principle the standards here involved are indistinguishable
from the standards considered in that case. Indeed it is argued
that the circUnistances in that case presented an even greater
reason for upholding the enactment; that it was decided upon
a declared state of emergency in unemployment affecting the .
peace and welfare of the city, and affecting an industry more
personal in nature and therefore more subject to regulation.
But the court concluded that "the private advantage of a
small group, not a class, composing a small percentage of the
population ... does not make a price fixing ordinance for
that group alone legislation for the general welfare. • • •u
The plaintiff seeks a reversal on the ground that since the
decision in the Kazas case in 1937 the judicial treatment of
legislation dealing with an exercise of the police power has
advanced to a point where the principles of that decision
should not be controlling. It is particularly asserted that the
"error in the Kazas case is the holding that in order to regu-I
late the prices in an industry that industry must be 'clothed
with a public use' in the old and traditional sense of that '
term, " However the use of the phrase was in reference only
to the fact that the barbering business is not so "clothed
with a public interest" that the welfare of the industry itself
is directly related to the welfare of the public. The use
the court made of the phrase "affected with a public interest" in the Kazas case was in the same sense that the
Olsen and the Nebbia cases (Olsen v. Nebraska, supra, 313 U.S.
236; Nebbia v. New York, supra, 291 ,U.S. 502) had used it,
namely, as an aid to determine when a statute provides for

I
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the general welfare. This was indicated in the Kazas ease
by a citation of the following excerpt from State v. Ives, 123
Fla. 401 [167 So. 394] : "Such a regulation could be justified
only upon the fact that the barber trade is a paramount industry of the state intimately connected with its welfare, so
that the state may, through an agency such as the board of
barber examiners, prescribe prices for the services to be
rendered by each barber. . . .
"Reduced to its last analysis, the thought underlying the
act seems to be not that the barber trade is a paramount industry affecting the general welfare, but that the prosperity
of the barber class sufficient to maintain the average barber
and his family 'properly' is a sufficient reason for the exercise by the state of the power of direction, control and management of the barber business. . . ."
Although the Florida Supreme Court in a later decision
(Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning &: Laundry
Board (1938), 134 Fla. 1 [183 So. 759]), upheld the validity
of a statute ,regulating prices in the dry cleaning industry,
it reiterated its position in regard to the use of the "affected
with a public interest" phrase as employed in its modern
sense. The court said: "There is no magic in the phrase
'clothed with or affected with a public interest'. Any business
is affected by a public interest when it reaches such proportions that the interest of the public demands that it be reasonably regulated to conserve the rights of the pUblic. . .. " This
statement of the doctrine is in accord with Its application in
the Kazas case. If it may be said that the Florida court in the
Miami Laundry Co. case abandoned its position in the I ves
case it apparently 'did so on the theory that the Supreme
Court of the United States had, in the Nebbia case, thrown
open to price regulation all lines of business legislatively declared to be affected with the public interest and therefore
subject to price control. The able dissenting opinions in the
Miami Laundry Company case would seem to be clearly in
accordance with the weight of authority.
Returning to the Kazas case it must be said that it correctly
employed the "affected with a public interest" phrase in the
same manner as that phrase was employed in the Nebbia case
three years earlier. Because of the closeness of the milk industry to the public health the Supreme Court saw fit to
classify it as "affected with a public interest," or subject
to price regulation for the public good. But it does not follow
that all other businesses in which the public is served should
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fall within the same classification. If they do there is no limit
which the Legislature is bound to respect and all businesses
are subject to its uncontrolled power to fix prices.
The doctrine of the Kazas case has been followed in other
jurisdictions. (Kent Stores v. Wilentz, 14 F.Supp. 1; Becker
v. State, 7 Harr. 454 [185 A. 92] ; Mobile v. Rouse, 233 Ala.
622 [173 So. 266, 111 A.L.R. 349].) The most recent decision declaring unconstitutional a minimum price statute
similar to the present case was announced by the Supreme
Court of Oregon on April 2, 1952. In Christian v. La Forge,
194 Ore. 450 [242 P.2d 797], that court declared that
"perhaps the best discussion of the subject is to be found
in In re Kazas, supra." The Oregon court quoted at great
length from that opinion and declared invalid the statute
before it on the same reasoning. Additional decisions in other
states which have expressly followed the Kazas case are
the following: Edwards v. State Board of Barber Examiners
(1951), 72 Ariz. 108 [231 P.2d 450] ; Revne v. Trade Com.
(1948), 113 Utah 155 [192 P.2d 563, 3 A.L.R.2d 169] ; State
Board of Barber Examiners v. Cloud (1942), 220 Ind. 552
[44 N.E.2d 972]. The case is recognized as a leading authority by the highest courts of sister states and receives
the approval of this court. Seeking its disapproval the plain- '
tiff states that the decision in the case of In re Lasswell, 1
Cal.App.2d 183 [36 P.2d 678], has been completely ignored.
That case upheld the constitutionality of the California Industrial Recovery Act, and particularly held that provisions
fixing minimum prices in the dry cleaning industry were
valid. The decision in that case has been properly "ignored.
The California Industrial Recovery Act was legislation
enacted to supplement the National Industrial. Recovery Act
of 1933, and in effect adopted the federal statute to extend
its application to intrastate commerce. In effect the Supreme
Court of the United States in Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 [55 S.Ct. 837, 97 A.L.R. 947],
overruled 111 "e Lasswell and rendered inoperative the California price fixing statute. The Lasswell decision cannot
therefore be relied upon as authority for the validity of the
price fixing provisions of the present statute.
In Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau v. National Candy
d': Tobacco Co. (1938), 11 Ca1.2d 634 [82 P.2d 3, 118
A.L.R. 486]. this court sustained the Unfair Practices Act.
The court there held that the purpose of the act was the
prevention of destructive competition and injury to com-
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petitors. That is a legitimate objective in the interest of the
general welfare, and on this basis is distinguishable from
the present statute.
In Jersey Maid Milk J>f·oducts 00. v. Brock (1939), 13
Ca1.2d 620 [91 P.2d 577], this court upheld the constitutionality of the Milk Stabilization Act (Agr. Code, chap. 10,
div. IV), involving the regulations including the fixing of
minimum prices in the sale of fluid milk. The statute there
under consideration is clearly distinguishable from the present
one on the same basis as is N ebbw v. N ew York (1934), supra,
291 U.S. 502. There as before stated it was held that there
is a public need for a constant supply of pure, wholesome
milk; that the milk industry concerns not only the economic
welfare but the health of the public in general, and legislation which aims to protect that general welfare through an
initial protection of an industry is within the scope of the
police power. The e1Iect of the statute here involved is to
protect the industry only-a small segment of the general
public. On this same ground, the decision in Agricultural
Prorate Com. v. Superior Oov.rt (1936), supra, 5 Cal.2d 550
is not in point.
In Max Factor &; 00. v. Kunsman, 5 Ca1.2d 446 [55 P.2d
177], the validity of the Fair Trade Act was upheld. That
act does not involve alone the question of legislative authority in the field of price regulation. It is an act to enforce
contracts, express or implied, between vendors and vendees
in which they agree to maintain specified standards of prices
upon trade-marked commodities. Although the retail~r in
that case had not expressly been a party to the agreement,
nevertheless a majority of the court held that an agreement
to sell at the fixed price was implied when that retailer
ordered goods which he knew or should have known were
fair trade items. The court stated at page .64: •• The statute
. . . is aimed at protecting these valuable property and eon-.
tract rights of the manufacturer or producer-rights just as
valuable and just as much entitled to protection as the right
of the retailer, who is attempting, by exercising his claimed
right of freedom of action, to injure the property and contract rights of the manufacturer or producer. The statute,
in other words, does not merely prohibit price-cutting in order
to regulate prices, but prohibits price-cutting in an attempt
to protect the validly acquired rights of others." The Max
Factor case affords no support for the plaint.iff's position.
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It must be concluded that the price fixing prOVlSlon
of the statute here involved is invalid because it is not, by
any recognized or recognizable standard, an enactment providing for the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.
The defendant points to another ground upon which the
invalidity of the statute may well be based. Section 9564
of the code requires that the •• board shall investigate and
ascertain those minimum prices which will enable cleaners,
dyers, or pressers in that . . . area to furnish modern, proper,
healthful and sanitary services, using such appliances and ,
equipment as will minimize the danger to public health and
safety incident to such services." The only other reference
to an established standard is in section 9566 as follows:
"At the conclusion of an investigation therefor, the board
may establish a reasonable and just minimum price schedule I
conforming to the requirements of this article." [14] While
the delegation of governmental authority to an administrative
body is proper in some instances, the delegation of absolute
legislative discretion is not. To avoid such a result it is
necessary that a delegating statute establish an ascertainable·
standard to guide the administrative body. [15] Here the
statute assumes to confer legislative authority upon those
who are directly interested in the operation of the regulatory
rule and its penal provisions with no guide for the exercise
of the delegated authority. The board is made up of six
active members of the industry, and one member of the public
at large. The initiation of the proposed control is at the
insistence of 75 per cent of the tlleaners in the area. In declaring invalid the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of
1935, the United States Supreme Court stated: c'. . . one
person may not be entrusted with the power to regulate the
business of another, and especially of a competitor. And a
statute which attempts to confer such power undertakes an
intolerable and unconstitutional interference with personal
liberty and private property. The delegation is so clearly
arbitrary, and so clearly a denial of rights safeguarded by
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, that it is
unnecessary to do more than refer to decisions of this court
which foreclose the question." (Carter v. Carter Caol Co.,
298 U.S. 238, 311 [56 S.Ct. 855, 80 L.Ed. 1160].)
In Becker v. State, supra, 7 Harr. 454, the Supreme Court
of Delaware set aside the Delaware Dry Cleaning Law. It
stated that •• vast authority is centered in a governing board,
a majority of which are directly interested in the industry,
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but who, nevertheless are empowered to act in a judicial
capacity, and to sit in judgment over fellow members of the
trade. Too great a strain is imposed upon human frailty. The
practical tendency of the legislation is to create and foster
monopoly, to prevent, not to encourage, competition, to maintain maximum, not minimum prices, all of which is against,
-not in aid of, the interests of a consuming public."
Where the Legislature attempts to delegate its powers to
an administrative board made up of interested members of
the industry, the majority of which can initiate regulatory
action by the board in that industry, that delegation may
well be brought into question.
.
From the foregoing it follows that the price fixing provisions
of the statute under attack .must fall on the constitutional
grounds stated, and that the demurrer was properly sustained.
The judgment is affirmed.
.
Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-In my opinion the minimum price provisions of the Dry Cleaners' Act of 1945 do not violate the due
process clause of either the United States Constitution or the
California Constitution.
The'Legislature has power to determine the rights of persons, subject only to the limitations of the United States Constitution and the California Constitution. (Modern Barber
Colleges, Inc. v. California Emp. S!ab. Com., 31 Cal.2d 720,
726 [192 P.2d 916] ; Delaney v. -Lowery, 25 Cal.2d 561, 568
1I54 P.2d 674} ; Collins v. Riley, 24 Cal.2d 912, 916 [152 P.2d
169].) A statute regulating commercial transactions does not
violate the due process clause of either Constitution unless it is
proved so unreasonable as to dispel the presumption that it
rests upon some rational basis within the 'knowledge and
experience of the legislators. (Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236,
246 [61 8.Ct. 862, 85 L.Ed. 1305, 133 A.L;R. 1500]; United
states v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 [58 S.Ct.
778, 82 L.Ed. 1234]; Sertle Yourself Gas. etc. Assn. v.
Brock, 39 Ca1.2d 813, 817 [249 P.2.d 545] ; In re Fuller, 15
Ca1.2d 425, 428 [102 P.2d 321] ; Jersey Maid Milk Products
Co. v. Brock, ]3 Ca1.2d 620, 636 [91 P.2d 577] ; Wholesale
Tobacco Dealers Bureau v. National Candy &7 Tobacco Co.,
11 Ca1.2d 634, 643 [82 P.2d 3, 118 A.L.R. 486].) Judicial
inquiry uwhere the legislative judgment is drawn into ques.0 c.1d-I1
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tion, must be restricted to the issue whether any state of facts
either known or which could reasonably be assumed affords
support for it." (United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
supra, 304 U.S. 144, 154.) The statute in the present case,
like any other regulation of private enterprise, must be considered in this light.
Although early decisions held that prices could not be regulated unless the industry was clothed with a public interest
(see Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 [48 8.0t. 454, 72 L.Ed.
913]), the United States Supreme Oourt discarded that test in
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 531-539 [54 8.0t. 505, 78
L.Ed. 940]. (See, also, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 [57 8.0t. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703, 108 A.L.R. 1330].) In
Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 244 [61 8.0t. 862, 85 L.Ed.
1305, 133 A.L.R. 1500], the court in a unanimous opinion
overruled the Ribnik case and refused to inquire into the
wisdom of the challenged legislation. The Olsen decision reversed the decision of the state court, 138 Neb. 574 [293 N.W.
393], holding the price-fixing statute in question unconstitutional. This court soon followed the lead of the United States
Supreme Court. (Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau v. National Candy & Tobacco Co., supra, 11 Oal.2d 634, 655.) The
Legislature, therefore, is clearly empowered to prevent de- .
structive price cutting, which has demoralizing effects on business itself and on its service to the public.
The dry cleaning industry has ~ unhappy history of ruthless competition marked by destructive price cutting and retaliatory sabotage. Early attempts at voluntary price regulation by internal agreements were struck down by the courts..
(Endicott v. Rosenthal (1932), 216 Cal. 721 [16 P.2d 673] ;
see, also, In re Herrick (1938), 25 Oal.App.2d 751 [77 P.2d
262] ). Thereafter, price cutting was fought by sabotage.
The chaotic state of the industry was brought to light in
People v. Cowan (1940), 38 Oal.App.2d 231 [101 P.2d 125],
a murder prosecution arising out of an attempt to sabotage a
dry cleaner who cut his prices, and in People v. Black (1941),
45 Cal.App.2d 87 [113 P.2d 746], a prosecution for conspiracy
to commit sabotage by placing metallic potassium in garments sent to a price cutter. It was there revealed that a
substantial number of industry members were guilty of unlawful attacks on retailers who cut prices. The industry
thereafter, from 1941-1945, achieved stabilization under price
regulation by the Office of Price Administration. After the
cessation of O.P.A. regulation, the statute now held un-
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constitutional was passed by unanimous vote of both houses
of the Legislature and signed by the Governor.
The dry cleaning business is highly vulnerable to price
wars and their attendant evils. The industry represents millions of dollars in plants and equipment and requires the
labor of thousands of skilled workers. It is subject to intense
short-period fluctuations. The dry cleaner cannot hedge
against these fluctuations by stock-piling inventory or by
large-scale buying of raw materials. He cannot supply his
market in advance, layoff help, and wait for demand to catch
up with supply as a manufacturer ordinarily can. A dry
cleaner is under constant pressure to cut his prices, increase
his volume, and reduce his costs. Other cleaners follow suit
and the price cuts inevitably result in downgrading of service.
The cleaning industry is particularly susceptible to downgrading: its processes are highly specialized and it is difficult to police against slipshod performance or to detect it.
Destructive price cutting quickly starts a vicious train of
sabotage, violence, eventual bankruptcy for many cleaners,
and disruption of a service industry essential to the public
health..
The statute sets the minimum price schedule as low as is
consistent with efficient and sanitary service. (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 9564.) Prices can be fixed only after a cost survey
and due investigation by the board. (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§§ 9564-9566.) If the board should abuse the discretion vested
in it, its action is subject to judicial correction.· (Gov. Code,
§ 11440.) The statute thus limits the 'competitive struggle in
the industry to the quality of service offered to the public.
The Legislature could reasonably conclude that the economic waste, the loss of propertY, the violation of law, the
threat to health and public convenience, could be prevented
by elimination of price warfare through establishment of minimum price schedules. It could reasonably conclude that a
measure of economic security would encourage compliance
with health and safety regulations and the maintenance of
the industry's capacity to meet the fluctuating demand of the
public at reasonable prices.
Disruption of business by destructive competition has long
been recognized as an evil that may be. controlled by the
Legislature. Thus in Max Factor & 00. v. Kunsman, 5 Ca1.2d
*Defendants contend only that the statute is unconstitutional &I a
whole. No claim is made that the particular price aehedulea :fixed by the
board are unauthorized by the statute.
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446 [55 P.2d 177], affirmed, 299 U.S. 198 [57 8. Ct. 147, "si :
L.Ed. 122], this court held constitutional a statute requiring
retailers to sell products at a price fixed by the wholesaler.
The court said: "In the first place, this court has neither
the power nor the duty to determine the wisdom of any
economic policy; that function rests solely with the legislature. We recognize that economic and juridical thought is,
and for many years has been, divided on the economic question as to the benefits to the consuming public of free and
open competition, and its necessary corollary, price-cutting.
. . . The members of this court mayor may not agree with
the economic philosophy of the Fair Trade Act, but it is no
part of the duty of this court to determine whether the
policy embodied in the statute is wise or unwise." (5 Ca1.2d
at 454-455.) The majority opinion would distinguish the
Max Factor case on the ground that the only question there
decided was the right to enforce "implied" contracts between vendors and vendees who "should have known" that
certain goods were fair trade items. The distinction is untenable. The retailer in the Max Factor case had not at any
time agreed to sell at the fixed price and was being compened
by the court to abide by the price determined by the wholesaler. A statute requiring a nonsigning retailer to sell at
a fixed price under penalty of an injunction is as much
a price fixing statute as is the statute in the present case.
The Max Factor case is clear authority for the proposition
that the Legislature may enact price fixing legislation, if it ~
determines that price cutting will adversely affect a particular
industry to the detriment of the public. In other cases also
this court has approved price regulation. (Jersey Maid Milk
Products 00. v. Brock, cSupra; Wholesale Tobacco Dealers v.
National etc. 00., supra; see, also, 1"" I"e WiUing, 12 Cal.2d
591, 594 [86 P.2d 663].) The majority opinion would distinguish the Jersey Maid case on the ground that low milk
prices affect the general public, which·· needs a supply of
pure milk, but that dry cleaning prices protect only the
industry. Unless this court intends to return to the "clothed
with a public interest" test, I see no basis for the proposed
distinction of the Jersey Maid case. The question of the
need of the legislation in a partiCUlar industry is one for
the Legislature; this court is not equipped to determine which
industries should receive price protection in the public interest and which should not. The majority opinion would
distinguish the Wholesale Tobacco case on the ground that
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the legislation in that case was designed to prevent destructive
competition, a proper legislative objective. The same objective underlies the statute in the present case.
The majority opinion holds that this case is governed by
In re Kazas (1937),22 Cal.App.2d 161 [70 P.2d 962], rather
than by the cases discussed in the preceding paragraph.
The Kazas case, however, turned on the question whether
the barber trade was "affected with a public interest," a
standard long since discarded by the United States Supreme
Court and by this court. (Olsen v. Nebraska, supra; Wholesale Tobacco Dealers v. National etc. Co., supra.) Moreover,
the Kazas case relied upon State v. Ives, 123 Fla. 401 [167
So. 394], a case subsequently abandoned by the court that
decided it. (Miami Laundry 00. v. Florida Dry Cleaning &
Laundry Board, 134 Fla. 1, 54 [183 So. 759].) I would disapprove the Kazas case as clearly contrary to presently
accepted principles of constitutional law.
It is contended that the Dry Cleaners' Act of 1945 could
not have the objective of protecting the public health and
safety because the Legislature could reach that· objective by
enforcement of provisions of the Health and Safety Code
and of the Unfair Practices Act. This reasoning proceeds
from a misconception of this court's function in passing
upon the constitutionality of a legislative enactment. The
only question before us is whether there is a rational basis
for the statute. Questions regarding the wisdom of the legislation are irrelevant. (Olsen v. Nebraska, supra, 313 U.S.
at p. 246.) It was for the Legislature to determine whether
additional legislation was necessary to preclude conditions in
the dry Cleaning industry that would adversely affect the
public welfare. An attack on a statute cannot be justified
by an assumption that there are wiser methods of reaching
the desired objective. (Hunter v. JlI,stice's Oourt, 36 Ca1.2d
315,319 [223 P.2d 465].)
A number of decisions from other states have held constitutional the regulation of prices in the dry cleaning and
barber industries. (Miami Laundry v. Florida Dry Oleaning
Board, supra; People v. Barksdale, 104 Colo. 1 [87 P.2d 755] ;
State Dry Cleaners' Board v. Oompton, 201 Okla. 284 [205
P.2d 286] ; Arnold v. Board of Barber Examiners, 45 N.M.
57 [109 P.2d 779] ; Board of Barber Examiners v. Parker,
190 La. 214, 266 [182 So. 485]; State v. McMasters, 204
Minn. 438 [283 N.W. 767] ; 119 A.L.R. 1481; 111 A.L.R. 353.)
The reasoning of the court in the Arnold case is typical of
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the foregoing decisions: "The record before us discloses the
hazards to the health of that large portion of the public
which patronizes barber shops, in the price cutting competition which prevails, absent regulation and fixing of the
minimum to be charged. The sanitary requirements set up
by earlier act of 1935 (Chap. 111, Laws 1935), appellant
urges, are in themselves sufficient to insure health protection
and sanitary working conditions. But the record before us
offers support to appellees' contention that in price wars
and where non-profitable charges are made for barbers' services, the sanitary safeguards are uniformly sacrificed. This
was the situation which we have a right to assume the legislature intended to correct. . . . We recognize Ex parte Kazas,
22 Cal.App.2d 161 [70 P.2d 962], relied upon by appellant,
as authority opposing the constitutionality of a statute similar to our own. It is clearly opposed to the authority relied
upon by appellees and to much we have here said. It is
quite obvious also that the California court took its position
in that case notwithstanding the changed doctrine announced
and followed in the Nebbia and West Coast Hotel Company
cases, supra. We pass further consideration of this case,
however, with the observation that in our opinion, it is contrary to the weight of recent authority and the better reasoned
decisions, as is also other authority relied upon by appellant."
(109 P.2d at 785-786.)
Most of the cases holding statutes regulating dry cleaning
and barber prices unconstitutional were decided in 1937 or
earlier, before the decision in West Ooast Hotel v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 [57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703, 108 A.L.R. 1330] .
. Thus, State v. Ives, supra, 123 Fla. 401, quoted· at length
in the majority opinion, was decided upon authority of
Adkins v. Ohildren's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 [43 8. Ct.
394, 67 L.Ed. 785], expressly overruled in the West Coast,'
Hotel case. As previously pointed out, the Florida Supreme '\
Court has abandoned its position in State v. Ives. Again,
the majority opinion relies on Oity of Mobile v. Rouse (1937),
27 Ala.App. 344 [173 So. 254.] That decision was cited as
controlling by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Board of
Barber Examiners v. Parker, 190 La. 214 [182 So. 485].
Before the decision in the Parker case became final, the
United States Supreme Court filed its opinion in the West
Coast Hotel case. The Louisiana court thereupon granted a
rehearing, reversed its earlier decision relying on the Rouse
case, and held the barber statute constitutional. (190 La.
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266 (182 So. 485].) Another case cited by the majority,
Becker v. State (1936), 37 Del. 454 (185 A. 92], was also
decided before the recent United States Supreme Court cases.
It is true that several recent cases support the majority
opmIOn. (Christian v. La Forge, 194 Ore. 450 [242 P.2d
797] ; Noble v. Davis, 204 Ark. 156 [161 S.W.2d 189] ; State
v. Greeson, "174 Tenn. 178 [124 S.W.2d 253]; State Board
of Barber Examiners v. Cloud, 220 Ind. 552 [44 N.E.2d 972] ;
Edwards v. State Board of Barber Examiners, 72 Ariz. 108
[231 P.2d 450].) The Greeson, Cloud, and Edwards cases
expressly relied upon Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
[25 S.Ct. 539, 49 L.Ed. 937]. The United State Supreme
Court, however, no longer adheres to the constitutional
doctrine expressed in the Lochner and similar cases, such
as Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 [28 S.Ct. 277, 5 L.Ed.
436] ; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 [17 s.Ot. 427, 41
L.Ed. 832] ; and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 [35 S.Ct. 240,
59 L.Ed 441]. "This Court beginning at least as early as
1934, when the Nebbia case was decided, has steadily reo
jected the due process philosophy enunciated in the Adair·
Coppage line of cases. In doing so it has consciously returned
closer and closer to the earlier constitutional principle that
states have power to legislate against what are found to be
injurious practices in their internal commercial and business
affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific
federal constitutional prohibition, or of some valid federal
law. See Nebbia v. New York, supra, at 523·524, and West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, supra, at 392.395, and cases cited.
Under this constitutional doctrine the due process clause
is no longer to be so broadly construed that the Congress
and state legislatures are put in a strait jacket when they
attempt to suppress business and industrial conditions which
they regard as offensive to the public welfare." (Lincoln
Union v. Northwestern Iron &- Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525,
536.537, 542, 557 [59 S.Ct. 251, 260, 267, 93 L.Ed. 212, 6
A.L.R.2d 473].) In view of the Nebbia, West Coast Hotel,
and Olsen cases, and the decisions of this court in the Jersey
Maid and Max Factor cases, I cannot regard as controlling
the decisions from other states holding similar legislation
unconstitutional.
As an alternative ground of decision, the majority opinion
st.ates that the Dry Cleaners' Act "may well be" unconsti.
tutional because it "assumes to confer legislative authority
upon those who are directly interested in the operation of

)

456

STA.TE BOARD

tI.

THRIFT-D-Lux CLEA.NERS

[40 C.2d

the regulatory rule and its penal provisions with no guide
for the exercise of the delegated authority."
The members of the State Board of Dry Cleaners are appointed by the Governor and approved by the Senate. They
are officials of the state, paid by the state for administering
the law, and their acts are reviewed by the judiciary. The
fact that six members of the board must be members of the
cleaning industry has no constitutional significance. (See
Ex parte Gerino, 143 Cal. 412, 414 [77 P. 166, 66 L.R.A.
249 J [Board of Medical Examiners elected by members
of regulated professionJ ; Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry
Cleaning &7 Laundry Board, 134 Fla. 1, 13 [183 So. 759, 764,
119 A.L.R. 956J; see, also, Davis, Administrative Law, pp.
380-381.) It may be debatable whether the manifest advantages of submitting highly technical problems to an informed
tribunal are outweighed by the possible danger that an agency
largely composed of members representing an interested economic group may be tempted to act for selfish ends. The
Legislature is free to make its choice. (See Opp Cotton Mills
v. Administrator of Wage and Hour Div., 312 U.S. 126, 144
[61 8.Ct. 524, 85 L.Ed. 624].)
The fact that price regulation is initiated at the insistence
of 75 per cent of the cleaners in the area does not present
constitutional difficulties. Whatever their special interest in
articulating the problem, it remains a general one, of the
greatest concern to the public. Governmental processes are
commonly set in motion by the petition, complaint, or other
action by some individual or group: Thus, the Administrative Procedure Act provides that" Except where the right to
petition for adoption of a regulation is restricted by statute
to a designated group . . . any interested person may petition a state agency requesting the adoption or repeal of a
regulation . . . . [A] state agency shall within 30 days deny
the petition in writing or schedule the·· matter for public
hearing." (Gov. Code, §§ 11426-11427.) In Agricultural
Prorate Com. v. Superior Court, 5 Ca1.2d 550, 554, 586-587
[55 P.2d 495], this court upheld a statute providing that the
details and area of a proration program be determined by
the filing of a petition signed by two-thirds of the producers
in the area. We rejected there a contention that apparently
is accepted in the majority opinion: that the delegation of
power to the industry to initiate action invalidated the statute. In Jersey Maid Milk Products Co. v. Brock, 13 Cal.2d
620, 645 [91 P.2d 577], we upheld a requirement that 65
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per cent of the producers in the regulated industry decide
that a stabilization plan should be formulated. (See, also,
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 [63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed.
315] [upholding the statute involved in Agricultural Prorate
Com. v. Superior Court, supra] j Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S.
1, 15-16 [59 S.Ct. 379, 83 L.Ed. 441] j Ray v. Parker, 15 Cal.
2<1 2i;), 28!i-28i l]01 P.2d 665] j Davis, Administrative Law,
pp.71-73.)
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 [56 S.Ct. 855, 80
L.Ed. 1160], is not applicable here. In that case, the prices

were fixed by private persons in the industry. The present
case is analogous to Sunshine A. Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S.
381, 399 [60 S.Ct. 907, 84 L.Ed. 1263], where the United
States Supreme Court held the Carter case not controlling
and upheld a statutory plan for coal price fixing by which
district boards of code members proposed minimum prices,
which became effective upon approval by the agency. (See,
also, United States'v. Rock Royal Co-Op., 307 U.S. 533, 577578 [59 8.Ct. 993, 83 'L.Ed. 1446] j Jaffe, Law Making by
Private Groups, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 201.)
In Revfie v. Trade Com., 113 Utah 155 [192 P.2d 563, 3
A.L.R.2d 169], it was held that the Utah Legislature had un- ,
lawfully delegated to the barber industry the power to fix
minimum prices by agreement. That decision, however, is
clearly distinguishable. The Utah court said: "We recog'nize, of course, that the legislature may properly delegate
to some administrative body the duty of ascertaining the
facts upon which the provisions of a law are to function, and
also, that one of the methods of initiating activity on the part
of that administrative body may be by petition of the citizens
concerned. Such procedure is not in and of itself defective
as an improper delegation of legislative authority. The question of an improper delegation of legiSlative authority lies
embedded in the extent of the power granted to the administrative body." (192 P.2d at 567.) The court held the
Utah statute invalid on the ground that price schedules were
initiated by the members of the regulated industry. The
board could not fix prices upon its own initiative j it could
only accept or reject the prices suggested by the industry.
In contrast, under the Dry Cleaners' Act the board fixes the
prices under the standards set forth in sections 9564 to 9566,
and the industry has to accept the prices so fixed. Seventyfive per cent of the i,ndustry petitions the board 'to fix 8
price j the industry does not fix the price.
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The provision in the present statute does no. more than
relieve the board from making an expensive survey at the
instance of a few cleaners, and allows it to act only when
the need for regulation is apparent to a substantial number
of those who would be affected. Far from unlawfully delegating authority, the Legislature has merely restricted its
regulations by withholding their operation from a given
area until 75 per cent of the cleaners favor it. (See Currin v.
Wallace, supra, 306 U.S. 1, 15-16.)
The majority opinion states that the standards of the statute are an inadequate guide for exercise of the delegated authority. The challenged provision provides that the board
"shall investigate and ascertain those minimum prices which
will enable cleaners, dyers, or pressers in that . . . area to
furnish modern, proper, healthful and sanitary services, using
such appliances and equipment as will minimize the danger
to public health and safety incident to such services. . . . At
the conclusion of an investigation thereof r the board may establish a reasonable and just minimum price schedule conforming to the requirements of this article." (§§ 9564, 9566.)
Standards similar to those set forth in foregoing sections of
the Dry Cleaners' Act have been repeatedly upheld by this
court (Ray v. Parker, supra, 15 Ca1.2d 275, 286-287; Jersey
Maid Milk Products Co. v. Brock, supra, 13 Cal.2d 620, 645;
Agricultural Prorate Com. v. Superior Court, supra, 5 Cal.2d
550, 586-587; Nelson v. Dean, 27 Ca1.2d873, 881 [168 P.2d
16, 168 A.L.R. 467]) and by the United States Supreme
Court. (American Power & L. Co. v. Securities & Ezck ..
Com., 329 U.S. 90, 104-106 [67 S.Ct. 133, 91 L.Ed. 103]; ,
Avent v. United States, 266 U.S. 127, 130 [45 S.Ct. 34, 69·
L.Ed. 202]; Federal Radio Com. v. NelsO'l/, Bros. BO'nd &;
Mtg. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285 [53 S.Ct. 627, 77 L.Ed. 1166, 89
A.L.R. 406].) Minutely defined standards are not required
when, as here, flexibility is desirable. The Legislature cannot and need not anticipate every situation that might arise
and supply a rule for each situation. (See Hampton & Co.
v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407-408 [48 S.Ct. 348, 72
L.Ed. 624].) In the present case, the Legislature has plainly
stated the legislative objective and has established standards
adequate to guide the administrative determination of the
particular prices that should be fixed to carry out that objective. (See American Power &; L. Co. v. Securities & Ezch.
Com., supra.)
The real basis for the result reached by the majority opinion
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is an adherence to an economic view that minimum price legislation is not in the best interests of the general pUblic. But

as Mr. Justice Holmes long admonished, the economic and
moral beliefs of the judiciary are not embedded in the Constitution. There is no reason to suppose that judges are better qualified than legislators to determine what social and
economic programs should be adopted by the State of California.
I would reverse the judgment on the ground that plaintiff
has stated a cause of action under a valid statute.
Gibson, C. J., and Carter, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied April 2,
1953. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of
the opinion that the petition should be granted.

